Where do we start with data classification? Part 1: Let the data tell you

Part 1 - Let the data tell you

“Where do we start?” It is the question I get asked in nearly every Microsoft Purview engagement. Purview has a huge toolset - sensitivity labels, data loss prevention, insider risk, retention, Data Security Posture Management - but none of it works until the organisation has told Purview what it needs to protect. Purview does not know that a design specification is Contoso’s crown jewels. Contoso has to tell it.

That is classification, and it is where most projects stall. Workshops ask the business to list its sensitive data, the business lists what it can remember, and the result is a handful of sensitive information types (SITs) that miss most of what matters.

This series takes a different route. Instead of asking people what they think is sensitive, we ask the data. I use a Microsoft CDX demo tenant, Microsoft Security Copilot and the Data Security Posture Agent (preview) to discover what Contoso actually holds, and then turn those findings into classifiers. The series runs in five short parts:

All data in this series is fictional and lives in a Microsoft CDX demo tenant. Every script and template will be published to GitHub at the end of the series.

Start with what Purview already sees

Before building anything, look at what Purview has already found. Out of the box, Purview scans Microsoft 365 content against hundreds of built-in SITs and Microsoft’s pre-trained classifiers. In the Contoso tenant the Purview home page reported 1,866 items containing sensitive information. The top three types were All Full Names (301 items), a custom SIT called Proseware Merger (152 items) and EU Tax Identification Number (130 items).

The second most common sensitive type in this tenant is not a regulatory identifier. It is a custom type someone built to find a confidential merger. That is intellectual property, and built-in rules will never find it on their own.

The unified Classifiers page

Microsoft is rolling out a unified Classifiers page (preview) under Information Protection > Classifiers. It brings SITs, exact data match, trainable classifiers and document fingerprinting into one list, and runs alongside the classic pages.

The unified Classifiers page in Microsoft Purview (preview)
The unified Classifiers page in Microsoft Purview (preview)

The most useful change is two columns side by side: Classified items and Affected policies. Filter to trainable classifiers and custom SITs and the gap is obvious. Finance matched 134 items, HR 52. The custom Proseware Merger and Mark 8 Project types matched 152 and 101 items. Every one shows 0 affected policies.

Sensitive content found, no policy using it
Sensitive content found, no policy using it

That single view is a ready-made gap analysis: Purview has found the data and nothing is protecting it. It is also the limit of what you get for free. These columns only count what an existing classifier already recognises. Anything Contoso has never defined does not appear at all.

Why starting from SITs is backwards

Most guidance on the Posture Agent shows it searching for a SIT you already have: “find files containing credit card numbers that are shared externally”. That is useful for remediation, but it does not answer “where do we start?”. If you already knew your SITs, you would not be asking.

I learned this the hard way in the lab. My first prompt asked the agent to find unlabelled Mark 8 confidential data. It ran successfully and found 0 items. The prompt was turned into a literal keyword query, limited to the default 30-day window, over content that did not use those words. Searching for what you think exists finds nothing new.

The real value is the other way round. Describe the kind of content that would hurt the organisation if it leaked, let the agent find it by meaning, and then look for the patterns that repeat. Those patterns are your candidate SITs.

The Data Security Posture Agent (preview)

The Posture Agent is a Security Copilot agent in Microsoft Purview. It has two capabilities in two places:

  • Data discovery, in DSPM > Discover > Asset explorer > Posture Agent tab. You describe what you are looking for in natural language, choose the people, groups or sites to search, and the agent analyses files, emails and messages for that content.
  • Credential scanning, in Data Security Investigations > Posture agent. It scans selected locations for exposed passwords, keys and tokens and tracks each scan on a task board.
Data discovery lives in the new unified DSPM, under Asset explorer
Data discovery lives in the new unified DSPM, under Asset explorer

Note the banner: DSPM (classic) and DSPM for AI (classic) retire on 30 November 2026, and the agent only lives in the new unified DSPM. If you have been waiting to move, this is the push.

Things worth knowing before you plan around it:

  • It finds and reports. It does not act on its own. You can label selected files from the results, export a report or schedule the prompt to run daily, weekly or monthly.
  • Only two prompts can run at once, and a run may be capped at 5 GB or 10,000 items, returning the top 1,000 matches. It is a fast, targeted discovery tool, not a full-tenant inventory.
  • The default time range is the last 30 days. Ask for a wider range in the prompt if your content is older.
  • It needs Security Copilot capacity, and every run consumes it. Part 2 covers what that took and cost.

The agent is a non-human identity

Expand Permissions and roles in the setup dialogue and you will see that starting the agent creates its own identity, with permission to access, read and see metadata for documents and content.

The Posture Agent runs under its own identity with read access to content
The Posture Agent runs under its own identity with read access to content

That is a non-human identity with broad read access to your most sensitive data. Treat it like one: know who deployed it, review it with your other agent identities and make sure its activity is in your audit process. In the lab, the credential scanning task card even reads “Started by Data security posture agent” - the agent, not the admin, is the actor.

Role design matters too. Compliance Administrator and Security Reader can run the agent and see summaries. Viewing matched snippets or opening matched files needs content-level roles such as Data Classification Content Viewer or Purview Content Analyst. Our audit log showed exactly that split: the admin was granted the compliance roles and blocked on the content roles.

What we found

Once the prerequisites were in place (Part 2), one discovery-style prompt over a single user’s mailbox and OneDrive returned 20 items, none of them labelled:

  • A document named CR-227 Product Overview - a reference number format that no SIT covered.
  • Project Tailspin and Customer Purchasing Data for Project 9 - internal codenames that no SIT covered.
  • Contoso Patent Template and an R&D expense report - content defined by what it is rather than a pattern, which is a job for a trainable classifier.
  • An annual financial report draft, already covered by the built-in Finance classifier.
  • Noise: Power BI visual definitions, Outlook task reminders and meeting titles.

None of the useful findings were on anyone’s list. That is the point. Part 3 shows how each one becomes a classifier, and how to deal with the noise.

So where do we start?

  1. Look at what Purview already sees. The unified Classifiers page shows classified items against affected policies. That is your first gap list.
  2. Do not start by asking the agent about the SITs you already have. Ask it about the kind of content that would hurt you if it leaked.
  3. Treat the agent as a non-human identity from day one.
  4. Get the prerequisites right before you pay for capacity. That is Part 2.

References

Where do we start with data classification? Part 2: Getting the Posture Agent running

Part 2 - Getting the Posture Agent running

In Part 1 I argued that the Data Security Posture Agent changes where classification starts. This post is the honest version of getting it running. It took two evenings in a CDX tenant, a Pay-As-You-Go Azure subscription and a PowerShell session, and almost every step had a catch. Here they are, in the order you will hit them, with what it cost at the end.

The checklist

If you only read one section, read this one. Do these in order, and do the first one days before you need it:

  1. Turn on Purview Audit and confirm records are flowing.
  2. Get Security Copilot capacity, either through the Microsoft 365 E5 inclusion or by provisioning it in Azure.
  3. Allow Security Copilot to access Microsoft 365 data.
  4. Complete the unified DSPM setup, reviewing the pay-as-you-go collection policies before you click Start setup.
  5. Assign roles, including content-level roles for whoever needs to see matched content.
  6. Write your prompts and pick your data sources before you create any hourly capacity.
  7. Decide which Purview pay-as-you-go features you need, such as Data Security Investigations, and link an Azure subscription for Purview billing. These are billed separately from Security Copilot and E5 does not cover them.

1. Audit first, and days ahead

Purview Audit was off in the CDX tenant. Security Copilot setup could not enable audit logging of Copilot activity, and the unified DSPM setup will not complete without it. Turning it on was the longest delay of the whole lab.

The portal offered “Complete organisational setup”, then failed with InvalidOperationInDehydratedContextException. The Exchange Online organisation was dehydrated, which is common in demo and small tenants. The fix is in Exchange Online PowerShell:

Connect-ExchangeOnline
Get-OrganizationConfig | Format-List IsDehydrated
Enable-OrganizationCustomization
Set-AdminAuditLogConfig -UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled $true
Get-AdminAuditLogConfig | Format-List UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled

What to expect:

  • IsDehydrated reported False well before audit could actually be enabled. Reads and writes hit different replicas, so it is replication lag, not throttling. Disconnect, reconnect and retry every 15 minutes.
  • Audit was finally accepted about 73 minutes after the first attempt.
  • The first audit record appeared about seven hours later.
  • Audit is not retroactive. Nothing from the first evening - Security Copilot setup, the agent’s first runs or the classifier creation - was captured.

Gotcha: if you need audit evidence of an agent rollout, enable audit days before you start, not on the day.

2. Security Copilot capacity

Selecting Get started on the Posture Agent produced: “You do not have Security Copilot set up in your tenant.” Start agent stays greyed out.

Start agent is unavailable until Security Copilot is set up
Start agent is unavailable until Security Copilot is set up

The Microsoft 365 E5 route

Microsoft now includes Security Copilot with Microsoft 365 E5 and E7. Eligible tenants get 400 security compute units (SCUs) per month for every 1,000 paid user licences, up to 10,000 SCUs a month. It is provisioned automatically with 30 days’ notice, the allocation resets monthly and unused SCUs do not roll over.

Two words matter: eligible and paid. Demo and developer tenants do not qualify, and the rollout has been phased. I have yet to see it switched on in a customer tenant. Smaller customers should also do the maths: a 300-seat E5 organisation gets 120 SCUs a month.

The Azure route

Without the inclusion, you provision capacity yourself from an Azure subscription. In a CDX tenant that brought its own set of problems:

  • CDX tenants cannot start an Azure free trial. I created a Pay-As-You-Go subscription on a separate account and moved it into the CDX directory with Change directory.
  • After the move, the CDX admin had no role on the subscription. I used elevated access to assign one - remember to remove elevated access afterwards.
  • Assign Contributor rather than Owner. Owner triggers the role assignment condition screen, and Contributor is enough to create the capacity.
  • The role assignment defaults to Eligible through PIM. Switch it to Active, or it has to be activated before every use.

Then the capacity itself. The minimum is 1 SCU at $4 USD per hour, billed from the moment it is created. The form shows an estimated $2,920 a month, which is what happens if you forget to delete it.

Overage is on by default with no limit
Overage is on by default with no limit
  • Use overage units when needed is on by default at $6 USD per unit, with No limit selected. Turn it off for a lab, or set a max limit.
  • Both “Help improve Copilot” data sharing options are on by default and allow Microsoft human review of prompts and responses. Decide deliberately.
  • Form fields silently reset. Resource group, location and units did not stick on the first pass. Check every field before Create.
  • Deleting the capacity does not delete the Security Copilot workspace. When you provision again, you must Apply the new capacity to the existing workspace.

3. Let Security Copilot see Microsoft 365 data

The Posture Agent needs Security Copilot to read Microsoft 365 data. This is under Security Copilot > Owner > Plugin settings > Accessing data from Microsoft 365 services. Opting out means the agent cannot be used with Purview.

Security Copilot must be allowed to access Microsoft 365 data
Security Copilot must be allowed to access Microsoft 365 data

4. The unified DSPM gate

The first time you open the Posture Agent tab, Purview asks you to “Complete setup to unlock the unified DSPM experience”. It turns on auditing and analytics and creates three collection policies for AI, tagged Pay-as-you-go.

Review the pay-as-you-go collection policies before Start setup
Review the pay-as-you-go collection policies before Start setup
  • Select Edit and review the collection policies before Start setup. They capture Copilot and enterprise AI interactions and may generate charges.
  • Until this completes, and therefore until audit works, the gate keeps coming back. A first job may run, but Add data sources and View insights on finished jobs reopen the pop-up. You cannot even read your results.

5. First runs

With everything in place, the first prompt about five minutes after the capacity was created failed with “Could not start analysis job”. A retry a few minutes later worked.

The first prompt after creating capacity failed; a retry worked
The first prompt after creating capacity failed; a retry worked
  • Data sources must be added for every prompt. They do not carry over.
  • Searching by person works. Group search hung on Loading, and communication sites without a Microsoft 365 group never appeared in the picker.
  • Job estimation alone took 13 to 20 minutes, then reported 40 to 64 minutes remaining for a single person or group.
  • If you delete the capacity while a job is running, the job reports “found 0 items”. That looks exactly like a genuine empty result.
  • Every run, including failed ones, creates a session in Security Copilot history. That is useful evidence.

What it actually cost

Cost is the question every customer asks and few posts answer, so here are the real numbers. The lab used one Security Copilot capacity of 1 SCU on two occasions: about an hour and a half on the first evening, and 09:24 to 13:13 the next day. Azure Cost analysis, grouped by resource, showed the first evening a day later:

Azure Cost analysis for the first evening: 3 SCU-hours at €3.59
Azure Cost analysis for the first evening: 3 SCU-hours at €3.59
ItemBilledCost (EUR)Status
Capacity, evening one (18 to 19 Nov)3 SCU-hours€10.77Actual
Capacity, day two (09:24 to 13:13)4 to 5 SCU-hours€14.36 to €17.95Estimate
DSI and Purview pay-as-you-goNo investigations created€0Estimate
Total7 to 8 SCU-hoursAbout €25 to €29 (about $28 to $32)Estimate

The surprise was the first evening. The capacity existed for about an hour and a half, but it was billed for 3 SCU-hours: one on 18 November and two on 19 November. Billing appears to work per clock hour started, so a capacity that crosses the hour, or midnight, costs more than the minutes it ran. On that basis the day two capacity, which touched five clock hours, should land between 4 and 5 SCU-hours.

For context, €3.59 per SCU-hour is the $4 USD list price shown in the capacity form. Usage takes time to reach Cost analysis: the day two charges had still not appeared an hour after the capacity was deleted.

What this means for planning:

  • A focused lab or proof of concept costs tens of euros, not hundreds, provided you delete the capacity the moment you finish.
  • Most of my SCU-hours were spent waiting on job estimation, replication and retries, not running prompts. Doing the prerequisites first is the biggest saving available.
  • With the Microsoft 365 E5 inclusion, the same runs would come out of the monthly SCU allocation rather than an hourly bill. The trade-off is that a shared allocation can be used up by other teams’ agents and prompts.

How to keep it down:

  • Do the audit, Microsoft 365 data access and unified DSPM steps before you create capacity. Anything that waits on replication should not be waiting on an hourly meter.
  • Create the capacity at the top of the hour and delete it just before the next one.
  • Write your prompts and choose data sources in advance.
  • Turn overage off, set an Azure budget alert and delete the capacity as soon as you are finished. Budget alerts warn you; they do not stop spending.

Pay-as-you-go: the bill E5 does not cover

Security Copilot is only one meter. Several Purview features are billed pay-as-you-go through an Azure subscription linked to Purview, and the Microsoft 365 E5 inclusion does not cover them. You link the subscription once, Purview creates a billing resource in a resource group you choose, and you pay for what you use. The ones this series touched:

  • Data Security Investigations - storage per GB per month, plus AI compute units for investigations and AI analysis. Both have their own setup tasks: pay-as-you-go billing and AI capacity.
  • Collection policies for AI - created by the unified DSPM setup in step 4 to capture Copilot and enterprise AI interactions.
  • Some DLP policy features - the DLP Policies page shows “Set up pay-as-you-go billing” until a subscription is linked.
Linking an Azure subscription for Purview pay-as-you-go billing
Linking an Azure subscription for Purview pay-as-you-go billing

Gotchas from linking it in the lab:

  • The wizard suggests “Contoso” as the resource name, then rejects it because default names are not allowed. Enter your own.
  • Put the billing resource in the same resource group as your Security Copilot capacity, so teardown is one delete.
  • Linking took about three minutes, and the confirmation warns it can take a few hours to show in the account.
  • The billing resource was created in West US, the tenant’s geography, whatever AI processing location you choose later.
  • Deleting the billing resource unlinks pay-as-you-go billing in Purview. The DLP banner came straight back.

Here is the catch I hit: the credential scanning half of the Posture Agent lives in Data Security Investigations, so I set up DSI billing and AI capacity expecting them to unblock a stuck credential scan. They did not, and Microsoft Learn confirms the Posture Agent does not need them - only investigations and AI analysis do. If you are only using the agent, you can skip DSI, but budget for pay-as-you-go as soon as you move from discovery into investigations.

If you do set up DSI AI capacity, watch the data residency choice. The processing location (Australia, Europe, United Kingdom or United States) is where analysis runs, not where your data lives, so pick your tenant’s home geography. Leave “allow the AI to process data anywhere in the world” unticked if sovereignty matters - it is labelled “recommended for optimal performance”, which makes it an easy click.

Pick the tenant's home geography and leave the "anywhere in the world" option unticked
Pick the tenant’s home geography and leave the “anywhere in the world” option unticked

Next

With the agent running, Part 3 gets to the point of the series: using its findings to define the sensitive information types Contoso did not know it needed.

References

Where do we start with data classification? Part 3: From discovery to definition

Part 3 - From discovery to definition

This is the part of the series I most wanted to write. Most guidance on the Data Security Posture Agent shows it checking for sensitive information types (SITs) you already have. Here I use it the other way round: to find the SITs Contoso did not know it needed, then build and test them.

How you ask decides what you get

The agent turns your prompt into one of two kinds of search, and the wording decides which.

A narrow prompt becomes a keyword query

My first prompt asked for “files and emails containing confidential Mark 8 product design, roadmap or project details that do not have a sensitivity label”. The agent could not express the OR and AND combination, or “no sensitivity label” without a label name, as one query. It said so, rewrote the prompt and showed the KQL it would run.

The agent rewrites a prompt it cannot express as a single KQL query
The agent rewrites a prompt it cannot express as a single KQL query

That job finished with 0 items. The query was a literal phrase, limited to the default 30-day window, over content that did not use those words. Searching for what you already think exists is the wrong way round.

A discovery prompt becomes a semantic query

The prompt that worked described intent rather than words:

Find confidential business documents created in the last 3 years that contain
internal project codenames, product specifications or recurring internal
reference numbers

The agent accepted it as written and ran it as a semantic query over the requested date range. Note the three things the prompt asks for. I was not looking for a specific document; I was looking for the shapes that sensitive content tends to have.

A discovery-style prompt runs as a semantic query over three years
A discovery-style prompt runs as a semantic query over three years

Tip: ask for a time range in the prompt. The default is the last 30 days, which excludes most of an organisation’s long-lived intellectual property.

Reading the results

Over one user’s mailbox and OneDrive, the job found 20 items, none labelled. The report bands them by how well they match the intent: 5 High (over 90%), 15 Medium (50 to 90%) and 0 Low.

The Posture Agent report: 20 items, 0 labelled
The Posture Agent report: 20 items, 0 labelled
The unlabelled items behind the summary
The unlabelled items behind the summary

The list is where the work is. I sorted it into four piles:

FindingWhat it tells usBecomes
CR-227 Product Overview.docxA recurring reference format: CR followed by three digitsA pattern SIT (regex)
Project Tailspin, Customer Purchasing Data for Project 9Internal codenames nobody had listedA keyword SIT
Contoso Patent Template, RD Expense ReportContent defined by what it is, not by a patternA trainable classifier (Part 4)
pbiviz.json files, DataMashup, task reminders, meeting titlesNoise: system files and calendar itemsNothing - exclude

Two things to know about the report. It counts duplicates (one Power BI visual appears three times), so 20 items is fewer distinct files. And it gives a band per item but no reason, so use Asset explorer to look at each file before you trust a pattern.

The findings that matter were not on anyone’s list. Nobody in a workshop would have said “we need to protect anything with a CR number”. The agent found the pattern because it appears in content that looks confidential.

Building the SITs

Creating a SIT costs nothing and needs no Security Copilot capacity. In the unified Classifiers page, select Create > Sensitive info type.

Contoso Change Request Reference

Name and describe the SIT so policy authors know what it detects
Name and describe the SIT so policy authors know what it detects

I built it with two patterns, so the confidence reflects the evidence:

  • High confidence: the regex CR-\d{3} plus at least one supporting keyword within 300 characters (change request, product overview, specification, confidential, internal only).
  • Low confidence: the regex on its own.

The first gotcha came straight away. Selecting Word match replaces whatever you typed with a template, and your regex has to go inside its capturing group:

(?:^|[\s,;\:\(\)\[\]"'])(CR-\d{3})(?:$|[\s,;\:\(\)\[\]"']|\.\s|\.$)
Word match wraps your pattern in a template; only one capturing group is allowed
Word match wraps your pattern in a template; only one capturing group is allowed
High confidence: the regex plus supporting keywords
High confidence: the regex plus supporting keywords
Two patterns, two confidence levels
Two patterns, two confidence levels
  • Choose from existing regular expressions does not list a regex from the SIT you are still creating. For the second pattern, enter it again.
  • The recommended confidence level only offers levels your patterns use. I chose High, so policies default to the stricter match.

Contoso Project Codenames

The codenames are a simple keyword list at Medium confidence: Project Tailspin, Tailspin and Project 9.

A keyword SIT for the codenames the agent found
A keyword SIT for the codenames the agent found

Be careful with short or generic keywords. “Project 9” is fine in Contoso’s demo data, but in a real organisation check how often a codename appears in ordinary content before you build a policy on it. A codename that is also a common word needs supporting keywords and a higher confidence pattern.

Test before you trust

The SIT’s Test option needs a file; there is no box to paste text into. I tested with a short file containing three real references (CR-227, CR-228, CR-231) and two decoys (CR-12 and CR-1234).

Three real references matched, with supporting keywords; the decoys did not
Three real references matched, with supporting keywords; the decoys did not

All three real references matched, with the supporting keywords listed for each. Neither decoy matched, which proves the word boundaries are doing their job. This is the check that stops a SIT from flooding a DLP policy with false positives.

The new SITs in the unified Classifiers page, ready for policies
The new SITs in the unified Classifiers page, ready for policies

The loop

That is the process this series is about. It repeats for every team and every data source:

  1. Ask the agent a discovery-style question about a team’s content.
  2. Sort the results into patterns, categories and noise.
  3. Build a SIT for each pattern, and test it with real and decoy examples.
  4. Send each category to a trainable classifier.
  5. Schedule the prompt to run monthly, so new patterns surface as the business changes.

Part 4 picks up the categories: teaching Purview to recognise documents such as Contoso’s design specifications with a trainable classifier.

References

Replacing SMS and voice MFA, Part 1: Lock down your passkey profiles first

Part 1 - SMS and voice MFA is ending: lock down your passkey profiles first

This series:
Part 1 - SMS and voice MFA is ending: lock down your passkey profiles first (you are here)
Part 2 - Who is actually ready?
Part 3 - Enforcing the right passkey at sign-in
Part 4 - The people problem

In short: Microsoft is switching off SMS text and voice call sign-in codes for Microsoft 365. Users are being moved to passkeys, but the default settings accept almost any passkey, including ones stored in personal Google or Apple accounts. This part shows how Contoso restricts that to Microsoft Authenticator for everyone and a YubiKey hardware key for its most privileged administrators.

Why SMS and voice are going

A code sent by text message or read out in a phone call proves very little. An attacker can trick a user into typing it into a fake sign-in page, or take over the phone number with a SIM swap. A passkey works differently: it is a cryptographic key held on the user’s phone or on a hardware key, it only works on the genuine Microsoft sign-in page, and there is nothing for the user to read out or type in. That is why passkeys are described as phishing-resistant.

Key terms used in this series

TermMeaning
PasskeyA sign-in credential stored on a phone, computer or hardware key, unlocked with a PIN, fingerprint or face. Replaces passwords and one-time codes.
Device-bound passkeyStays on one device or hardware key and cannot be copied. Microsoft Authenticator and YubiKeys hold device-bound passkeys.
Synced passkeyCopied between a user’s devices through a personal cloud account such as Google Password Manager or iCloud Keychain.
AAGUIDA model identifier every passkey provider reports, for example “Microsoft Authenticator for iOS” or “YubiKey 5 NFC”. It is how Entra ID tells one type of passkey from another.
AttestationProof, signed by the manufacturer, that the passkey really comes from the model it claims. Without it, the AAGUID is taken on trust.
Passkey profileA set of Entra ID rules for which passkeys a group of users may register.
Tier 0The most privileged administrators - those who can control the whole tenant. At Contoso their roles are managed with Privileged Identity Management (PIM) and they work from a Privileged Access Workstation (PAW), a locked-down device used only for admin work.
Conditional AccessEntra ID’s rules engine for sign-ins: who, from where, to what, and with which method.

The hard stop is coming

Microsoft has been signalling the end of SMS and voice as authentication methods for some time. That signal now has dates attached, and the first one has already passed.

  • 1 September 2026 - passkeys became the default authentication experience in Microsoft Entra ID. Every user enabled for SMS or voice was automatically enabled for passkeys and is nudged to register one at their next MFA sign-in.
  • 1 February 2027 - Microsoft-provided SMS and voice is retired for all users except Global Administrators and external users. After this date, a user whose only MFA method is SMS or voice must register a passkey before they can continue signing in. The prompt is blocking and there is no opt-out.
  • 1 July 2027 - the same retirement and blocking prompt apply to Global Administrators and external users.

There is a temporary opt-out from the automatic passkey enablement, set through Microsoft Graph, but it only covers the September 2026 to February 2027 window. It does not stop the retirement or the enforcement. Organisations with a genuine regulatory or operational need for SMS or voice will have to bring a third-party telephony provider from the Microsoft Security Store - the new Add telecom profile option on the Authentication methods blade is where that lives.

Authentication methods policies - note the new Add telecom profile option

What Microsoft does for you - and why that is not enough

If your tenant still has SMS or voice users, you will find a locked, system-managed row in the Passkey (FIDO2) policy: All SMS/Voice Users, assigned the SMS/voice user Passkeys profile. It is enabled by the system and cannot be turned off from the policy.

The system-managed All SMS/Voice Users target

Getting SMS and voice users onto passkeys is the right outcome. The problem is which passkeys. When passkey profiles were rolled out, existing settings were migrated into the Default passkey profile. In the Contoso tenant, that profile had no attestation, allowed both device-bound and synced passkeys, and had no key restrictions. In practice, any passkey provider a user chooses - Google Password Manager, iCloud Keychain, Samsung Pass or anything else - is acceptable.

Before: the Default passkey profile - no attestation, synced allowed, no key restrictions

Synced passkeys are phishing-resistant, but they live in a consumer account Contoso does not manage. The passkey that unlocks Microsoft 365 should be one Contoso can identify and control.

The design: two profiles, two populations

Passkey profiles let you set different rules for different groups. The Contoso design uses two:

  • Microsoft Authenticator - All users: attestation enforced, device-bound only, restricted to the Microsoft Authenticator for Android and iOS AAGUIDs. Assigned to All users for full coverage.
  • YubiKey 5 NFC (USB-A) - Privileged access: attestation enforced, device-bound only, restricted to the YubiKey 5 NFC AAGUIDs. Assigned to the _PIM Tier 0 security group, in line with a Zero Trust privileged access model where Tier 0 identities authenticate from a Privileged Access Workstation with a hardware key.

Building the YubiKey profile

In the Microsoft Entra admin centre, go to Entra ID > Authentication methods > Policies > Passkey (FIDO2) > Configure > Add profile.

Add passkey profile

Two behaviours in the portal are worth knowing before you start. First, once Enforce attestation is ticked, the only passkey type offered is Device-bound - synced passkeys do not support attestation.

With attestation enforced, only Device-bound is available

Second, when you tick Target specific AAGUIDs, the Behaviour defaults to Block, not Allow. Leave it on Block and you have built a block list. For an allow-list profile, change it to Allow before adding AAGUIDs.

Behaviour defaults to Block - switch to Allow for an allow list

Add AAGUID gives three choices: Windows Hello, Microsoft Authenticator (which adds both the Android and iOS AAGUIDs) and Enter AAGUID for anything else.

Add AAGUID options

A YubiKey model does not have a single AAGUID. It changes with firmware generation, and YubiKey firmware cannot be upgraded, so keys bought in different years report different values. To cover every YubiKey 5 NFC (USB-A) Contoso might issue, the profile includes:

  • fa2b99dc-9e39-4257-8f92-4a30d23c4118 - firmware 5.1
  • 2fc0579f-8113-47ea-b116-bb5a8db9202a - firmware 5.2 and 5.4
  • a25342c0-3cdc-4414-8e46-f4807fca511c - firmware 5.7
The YubiKey 5 NFC profile with three AAGUIDs

Building the Authenticator profile

Repeat the process with the Microsoft Authenticator shortcut. The portal adds the Android and iOS AAGUIDs and shows them by name rather than as GUIDs.

The Microsoft Authenticator profile

Assigning the profiles

On the Enable and target tab, change the All users target from Default passkey profile to Microsoft Authenticator - All users, then add _PIM Tier 0 as a target and assign it the YubiKey profile. The Default passkey profile cannot be deleted or renamed, but it no longer needs to be assigned.

Before and after: targeting
Before and after: passkey profiles

Can’t anyone just install Authenticator?

A fair challenge to this design: if the profile allows Microsoft Authenticator, any iOS or Android user can install the app, so what has been locked down? The answer is that the profile controls the type of passkey, not the phone it sits on - and that is exactly what it is meant to do.

  • The passkey cannot leave the device. An Authenticator passkey is device-bound and attested. It is not copied to a Google or Apple account, and it cannot be exported or shared. A synced passkey in a personal password manager can be, which is what the Default profile allowed.
  • Installing the app proves nothing on its own. Registering a passkey is itself an authenticated action: the user must already pass MFA to add one. The real risk is an attacker who has phished a password and an SMS code registering their own Authenticator. Part 3 closes that gap with a Conditional Access policy on security information registration.
  • Contoso can see and revoke it. Every Authenticator passkey appears against the user with its model, and the Part 2 report lists them. A lost phone is a single method to remove.

If Contoso wants passkeys only on company-managed phones, that is a device control rather than a passkey control - Intune compliance or app protection in Conditional Access - and it sits on top of this design rather than replacing it.

Does All users override the Tier 0 assignment?

No - and this is the point most likely to catch people out. Profiles are not evaluated in order, and none takes precedence. When a user is scoped into more than one profile, a passkey is allowed if it fully satisfies at least one of them. A Tier 0 admin who is in both All users and _PIM Tier 0 can therefore register either a YubiKey or an Authenticator passkey.

Excluding _PIM Tier 0 does not help either. The Exclude tab applies to the whole Passkey (FIDO2) method and takes precedence over every include, so excluded users lose passkeys entirely - YubiKey included.

Keep All users for full coverage. Passkey profiles control what can be registered. Conditional Access controls what must be used. Requiring the YubiKey for Tier 0 at sign-in is the subject of Part 3.

Before you change your own tenant

Recommended rollout order. This series is written in the order that best explains the controls, not the order to deploy them. In production: (1) report on what users have registered (Part 2); (2) start communications and offer an option to every user (Part 4); (3) create both profiles and assign the YubiKey profile to Tier 0; (4) move All users off the Default profile only when the Part 2 report shows nobody would be locked out; (5) enforce the YubiKey for Tier 0 with Conditional Access, report-only first (Part 3).

  • Key restrictions apply to sign-in as well as registration. Moving All users off the Default profile means any passkey registered under it that does not match the new profile - a synced passkey, or another vendor’s security key - stops working. Report on what is registered first. Part 2 covers how.
  • Attestation is checked at registration only. Enforcing it later does not invalidate passkeys registered without it.
  • Profile limits. The portal states that up to 10 passkey profiles are supported.
  • The system-managed SMS/voice target is outside your control. Moving those users off SMS and voice deliberately, rather than waiting for the February 2027 cut-off, is what puts them under your profiles.

Next in the series

Part 2 looks at the starting point: how to report on registered authentication methods per user, find who still relies on SMS or voice, and who has a passkey that will stop working once the Default profile is retired.

References

  • Microsoft Learn - SMS and voice retirement in Microsoft Entra ID
  • Microsoft Learn - Enable passkeys (FIDO2) and passkey profiles in Microsoft Entra ID
  • Microsoft Security blog - Passkeys are the default authentication method in Entra ID (13 July 2026)
  • Message Centre MC1221452 - General availability of passkey profiles (mc.merill.net)
  • Yubico - YubiKey hardware FIDO2 AAGUIDs

Replacing SMS and voice MFA, Part 2: Who is actually ready?

Part 2 - Who is actually ready? Reporting on authentication methods

This series:
Part 1 - SMS and voice MFA is ending: lock down your passkey profiles first
Part 2 - Who is actually ready? (you are here)
Part 3 - Enforcing the right passkey at sign-in
Part 4 - The people problem

In short: Before changing any sign-in settings, find out what each user has actually set up. This part shows the built-in Entra ID reports, why they are not enough on their own, and two free scripts that sort every user into a readiness group - from “ready” to “will be locked out in February 2027” - and turn those groups into action lists.

In Part 1, Contoso replaced the loose Default passkey profile with an Authenticator profile for all users and a YubiKey profile for Tier 0. In a production tenant, this report comes first: you need to know where every user stands before moving anyone off the Default profile. Otherwise the first anyone hears of a problem is a user who cannot sign in.

Start with the headline number

Entra ID > Authentication methods > Activity gives you the headline. In the Contoso tenant, 2 of 34 users were MFA capable and 0 were passwordless capable.

Authentication methods activity - 0 of 34 users passwordless capable

That is a useful number for a steering group. It does not tell you who to contact or what each of them needs.

Microsoft’s analyser checks policy, not people

Microsoft has published a PowerShell script for the retirement, Get-SmsVoicePolicyUsers.ps1 (github.com/microsoft/entra-sms-voice-usage-analyzer). It is worth running, but be clear about what it does. It reads the SMS and Voice method policy scope, the registration campaign state and the migration state, and exports the targeted groups and users to CSV.

It is a policy scope scanner, not a user inventory. It does not expand group membership, check registered methods or read sign-in activity. It tells you who SMS and voice are enabled for, not who depends on them.

User registration details

Entra ID > Authentication methods > User registration details is the per-user view. Each row shows whether the user is MFA capable, passwordless capable and SSPR capable, their default MFA method and every method they have registered. It can be filtered and downloaded as CSV.

User registration details - user names blurred

The Methods registered filter now separates Passkey (Microsoft Authenticator) from other passkeys, which is exactly the distinction the profiles in Part 1 depend on.

Methods registered filter

Why I built my own readiness scripts

Before Microsoft Graph, the quickest way to see each user’s methods was the MSOnline PowerShell module. With MSOnline retired, the community has filled the gap - AdminDroid’s free Export MFA Status Report script (published in the admindroid-community/powershell-scripts repository on GitHub) is a good example. In client reports I have generated, per-user reports like this have consistently surfaced users who have never registered Microsoft Authenticator - often users whose only method is a mobile phone number. Those are the users who will hit the blocking prompt in February 2027.

Generic MFA reports answer the question “does this user have MFA?”. For this migration the question is different: “will this user still be able to sign in once SMS and voice are gone and the restrictive passkey profiles from Part 1 apply?”. That needs the AAGUID of every registered passkey, checked against the profiles you plan to deploy - so I wrote two scripts for it, published in the cloud-secure-ai GitHub repository.

ScriptWhat it does
Get-PasskeyReadiness.ps1Read-only. Reads every user’s registered methods, including passkey models and AAGUIDs, and places each user in one readiness bucket. Exports a CSV and a console summary.
Sync-PasskeyReadinessGroups.ps1Creates one security group per bucket and keeps membership up to date. Supports -WhatIf.

The readiness buckets

BucketMeaning and action
SmsVoiceOnlyOnly phone-based MFA registered. Blocked from 1 February 2027. Highest priority.
PasskeyOutsideAllowHas a passkey whose AAGUID is not on your allow list - for example a synced passkey. It stops working when the Default profile is retired.
PrivilegedNoHardwareKeyMember of the Tier 0 group without an approved FIDO2 hardware security key. Fix before switching on the Part 3 policy.
NoAuthenticatorHas MFA, but no Microsoft Authenticator and no allowed passkey.
NotMfaCapableNo MFA method registered at all.
ReadyMicrosoft Authenticator or an allowed passkey registered.

Running the report

The script reads each user’s authentication methods directly, so the passkey AAGUIDs come back in the same call and it does not depend on Microsoft Entra ID P1 reporting. Phone numbers are masked to the last four digits, and nothing is written to the tenant. The allow lists match the Contoso profiles from Part 1:

$authenticator = 'de1e552d-db1d-4423-a619-566b625cdc84',   # Authenticator for Android
                 '90a3ccdf-635c-4729-a248-9b709135078f'    # Authenticator for iOS
$yubiKey5Nfc   = 'fa2b99dc-9e39-4257-8f92-4a30d23c4118',   # YubiKey 5 NFC 5.1
                 '2fc0579f-8113-47ea-b116-bb5a8db9202a',   # YubiKey 5 NFC 5.2/5.4
                 'a25342c0-3cdc-4414-8e46-f4807fca511c'    # YubiKey 5 NFC 5.7

.\Get-PasskeyReadiness.ps1 -AllowedAaguids ($authenticator + $yubiKey5Nfc) `
    -PrivilegedGroupId '<_PIM Tier 0 group object ID>' -PrivilegedAaguids $yubiKey5Nfc `
    -LicensedUsersOnly -EnabledUsersOnly

The output is a timestamped CSV and a summary by bucket. For scheduled runs, the script also supports certificate-based app authentication.

Requirements

  • Microsoft Graph PowerShell SDK
  • Get-PasskeyReadiness.ps1: User.Read.All, UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All and GroupMember.Read.All
  • Sync-PasskeyReadinessGroups.ps1: Group.ReadWrite.All and GroupMember.ReadWrite.All

Turn the report into groups

A report is only useful if it drives action. Sync-PasskeyReadinessGroups.ps1 loads each bucket into its own security group. Run it with -WhatIf first to see what it would create:

.\Sync-PasskeyReadinessGroups.ps1 -CsvPath .\PasskeyReadiness_<timestamp>.csv -GroupPrefix 'Contoso-MFA-' -WhatIf
.\Sync-PasskeyReadinessGroups.ps1 -CsvPath .\PasskeyReadiness_<timestamp>.csv -GroupPrefix 'Contoso-MFA-' -RemoveStale
  • Contoso-MFA-SmsVoiceOnly - targeted first by the registration campaign and communications (Part 4)
  • Contoso-MFA-PasskeyOutsideAllow - contacted before the Default profile is retired, so they can register an allowed passkey
  • Contoso-MFA-PrivilegedNoHardwareKey - issued a YubiKey before the Part 3 policy is switched on
  • Contoso-MFA-NoAuthenticator - targeted by the Authenticator registration campaign

Re-run both scripts weekly. With -RemoveStale, users drop out of a group as soon as they fix their registration, so the groups always reflect who still needs help. When SmsVoiceOnly and PasskeyOutsideAllow reach zero, retiring the Default passkey profile is a non-event.

Next in the series

Part 3 returns to the question left open in Part 1: if profiles are a union, how do you make sure Tier 0 admins actually sign in with their YubiKey? The answer is a Conditional Access authentication strength.

References

  • Microsoft Learn - SMS and voice retirement in Microsoft Entra ID
  • GitHub - microsoft/entra-sms-voice-usage-analyzer
  • Microsoft Learn - userRegistrationDetails resource type (Microsoft Graph)
  • AdminDroid community - Export MFA Status Report using MS Graph: github.com/admindroid-community/powershell-scripts/blob/master/Export%20MFA%20Status%20Report%20using%20MS%20Graph/GetMFAStatusReport.ps1
  • GitHub - cloud-secure-ai/entra-passkey-readiness (Get-PasskeyReadiness.ps1 and Sync-PasskeyReadinessGroups.ps1) - github.com/cloud-secure-ai/entra-passkey-readiness