Microsoft Defender AI agent runtime protection: finding the agents you did not know you had (part 3)

Microsoft Defender AI agent runtime protection, part 3: finding the agents you did not know you had

Series: Part 1 introduced AI agent runtime protection in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. Part 2 covered the lab build and validation. Part 3 goes back a step to the question that should come first: what is actually running on your endpoints?

Every organisation I work with has more AI agents running on its endpoints than it thinks it has. Not Copilot Studio agents, not Foundry agents, not anything that went near an architecture review. Developer tooling: Claude Code, the VS Code Claude Code extension, GitHub Copilot CLI, ChatGPT Desktop, Antigravity CLI. Installed by individuals, on managed laptops, with the full rights of the signed-in user, talking to MCP servers nobody has catalogued.

The Local agents tab in Microsoft Defender is the first Microsoft capability that gives you a straight answer to the question “what is actually running?”. This post covers what the view shows, how to get the data out of it, a set of advanced hunting queries that go well beyond what the portal surfaces, and – the part that matters – what you can actually do about what you find.

Part 1 of this series covered what AI agent runtime protection is and how it detects prompt injection against local agents. Part 2 covered the lab build and the validation work behind it. Both assumed you already knew which agents you were protecting. This part fills that gap, and in a real deployment it is the step that comes first.

Where the data comes from

Local agent discovery lives in the Defender portal under Assets > AI agents, on the Local agents tab. The Agents tab beside it covers cloud-hosted agents from Copilot Studio, Microsoft Foundry and Microsoft 365. Local agents are a separate pipeline and a separate onboarding story.

The mechanism is worth understanding, because it drives how you interpret the numbers:

  • Discovery is delivered by Microsoft Defender Antivirus, not by a separate agent, a script or a connector. There is nothing to deploy.
  • It is activity based, not installation based. An agent that is installed but has not run will not appear. The inventory answers “what has been used”, which is the more useful question, but it means the count climbs over time rather than landing fully formed.
  • Each row is one agent installation, scoped to a device and an account. The same agent on three devices is three rows. Two accounts on one device is two rows. The row count is not the agent count.

Prerequisites

  • Defender for Endpoint Plan 2, commercial cloud only. Sovereign and national clouds are not supported.
  • Devices onboarded to Defender for Endpoint, running a supported Windows or macOS build. macOS discovery is in preview.
  • Defender Antivirus in active mode with real-time protection enabled. Passive mode will not give you this.
  • Current monthly platform and engine updates.

The licensing split that catches people out

The inventory and the risk assessment are licensed separately, and this is the single most important thing to flag to a client before they go looking:

Capability Licence required
Discover agents, view the inventory, agent details, device and account, configured MCP servers Defender for Endpoint Plan 2
Query agents in advanced hunting, including the AgentsInfo table Defender for Endpoint Plan 2
Risk level, Risk indicators and security recommendations Microsoft 365 E7, or Microsoft Agent 365 with Defender for Endpoint Plan 2

An E5 tenant gets the inventory and the hunting table. The Risk level column that the view is built around needs E7 or Agent 365. Worth confirming against your own licence position before you build a report that depends on it.

Reading the Local agents view

Here is the tab in a tenant with nineteen agents discovered. Device names, device IDs, account names and account domains are redacted throughout – the blanked columns are deliberate, not a rendering fault.

The Local agents tab in the Microsoft Defender portal, showing discovered AI agents with device and account columns redacted

Agents insights

Three cards sit across the top: Total monitored agents, Agents at High Risk Level and Critical agents, each over a seven day window with a trend. In the Contoso tenant above that reads 19 monitored agents, up 27 per cent, with 4 at high risk, up 300 per cent, and no critical agents.

The 300 per cent jump is the useful signal, and it is also the trap. On an activity-based inventory, a week-on-week rise usually means discovery is still catching up rather than that four new risky agents appeared on Tuesday. Treat the first three to four weeks after enablement as a baselining period and do not report the trend to a steering group until it settles.

Columns

The default view gives you Agent name, Version, Device name, Device ID, OS platform, Device type, Account name, Account domain, Risk level, Risk indicators and Recommendations. Customize columns adds MCP servers, Local MCPs and First seen, and First seen is the one I always add – it is what turns the inventory into a timeline.

Filters are available on every column in the filter set, and Risk level is the obvious one to start with. Export writes the filtered list out, so the workflow for a client report is: filter to High, export, and work the resulting list. That is a perfectly good starting point. It is also where the portal stops being enough.

Making sense of the risk level

The Risk level column is the most valuable thing on this page and the most commonly misread. It is not a score for the agent as a product. It is a calculated view of this installation, of this agent, on this device, under this account, and the same agent will carry different risk levels on different rows for exactly that reason.

Defender derives it from the agent’s active risk indicators, weighing both the severity of each indicator and the combination of indicators present. Indicators that are inactive, or that could not be assessed because the supporting data was not available, do not contribute. The levels are:

Risk level What it means
High A serious combination of active indicators. Prioritise for review.
Medium Notable risk. Review and mitigate.
Low Minor active risk.
No known risk Assessed, with no active risk indicators found.
Not evaluated Not enough information to assess. This is a visibility gap, not a clean bill of health.

Not evaluated is the row people skip past. It means Defender could not gather enough about that agent to judge it, which on an activity-based inventory usually means it has only just been seen. Keep it on the list rather than filtering it out.

The indicators behind the level

Indicators come from the agent’s configuration, the tools and data it can reach, its runtime activity, the endpoint and user context around it, and any active alerts. Not every indicator applies to every platform. The ones you will see across agent types include:

  • Weak Instructions – the agent’s instructions do not give it enough guidance for safe, predictable behaviour.
  • High-usage Agent – used by multiple users, and likely to matter to business operations.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection Exposure – the agent may be exposed to indirect prompt injection. This is the indicator that ties the inventory directly to the runtime protection work in Parts 1 and 2.
  • Privileged Business-system Access – the agent has write access to key business systems.
  • Active Threat – there are active security alerts associated with the agent.

For local agents specifically, the context around the agent does most of the work:

  • Used by a critical user – the agent is associated with a user flagged as critical.
  • Running on a critical device – the agent is running on a device flagged as critical.
  • Running on a device with vulnerabilities – the host has known vulnerabilities.
  • Privileged Software Development Access – the agent can reach software development systems.

Those labels are what the portal renders. The underlying data uses different names, and the mapping is not documented anywhere, so here it is:

Property on the exposure graph node Portal label
agentOnCriticalDeviceIndicator Running on a Critical Device
agentOnVulnerableDeviceIndicator Running on a Device with Vulnerabilities
agentLinkedToCriticalUserIndicator Used by a Critical User
publishedAgentIndicator Publish status, applies to cloud agents rather than local ones

Each indicator is a separate property on the agent’s exposure graph node, sitting beside the aiAgentMetadata bag – not an array of indicator objects, which is the first thing most people reach for. Query 12 below puts them to work. If your tenant shows an indicator that is not in that table, query 12’s lead-in shows how to enumerate the full set.

One more thing the data makes obvious: an agent whose account could not be resolved cannot be assessed for the user-context indicators at all. If you see rows with a blank account name in the inventory, expect them to sit at Not evaluated or to carry a lower level than they deserve.

That last group is the point. A local agent inherits the identity and the access rights of the person running it, and it typically runs with broad permissions on the endpoint. The agent binary is rarely what makes a row High. Who is running it, and on what, usually is.

What that means for the four High rows

In the Contoso tenant in the screenshot above, the High rows are coding agents – two Claude Code installations, a VS Code extension and a desktop assistant – sitting under developer accounts. None of those tools is inherently more dangerous than the Medium rows below them. They rank higher because of the accounts and devices they are attached to, and because a coding agent reaching development systems picks up the privileged development access indicator that a general assistant does not.

Select a row and the Risk section of the flyout shows the indicators behind its level. Below are two agents from the same tenant: first a High one – running on a critical device, on a device with vulnerabilities, used by a critical user and by a privileged user – and then a Medium one, carrying two of the same indicators but neither of the two user-privilege ones.

Defender agent flyout showing a High risk level with four risk indicators
Defender agent flyout showing a Medium risk level with two risk indicators

Side by side those two make the calculation obvious. The difference between Medium and High here is not the agent and not the device – it is the account. Add the critical user and the privileged user indicators on top of the device context and the level moves up. That is the single most useful thing to understand about this column, and it is why query 14 groups by account rather than by agent.

Note also that Used by a privileged user appears on the High flyout and is not in the documented indicator set, which is a reminder that the published list is not complete and your tenant is the authority.

The practical read is that a High here is an instruction to look at the combination, not to go and uninstall the agent. Two questions answer most of them: does this person need this agent on this device, and is this device inside the runtime protection scope yet? Query 8 answers the first half properly by ranking on asset criticality, and query 11 answers the second.

Be careful about one trap. Some indicators cannot be remediated at all, because they describe the agent working as intended – an agent that needs access to critical systems is going to carry that indicator permanently. Those are there for prioritisation, not as a defect list. Chasing them to zero is wasted effort.

And remember that this whole column is the part of the page that needs Microsoft 365 E7 or Agent 365. On a plain E5 tenant you still get the inventory, but every row will be blank here and you will be prioritising from the hunting queries instead.

Why the export is not the end of the job

The export gives you the rows as displayed. It will not tell you which agents auto-approve their own actions, which are running under an untrusted host process, which MCP servers they are wired into, or which of those MCP endpoints are remote. For a real assessment you need advanced hunting.

Advanced hunting: a schema reality check first

Local agents land in the AgentsInfo table, which replaced AIAgentsInfo. Before you write anything against it, three things will save you half an hour:

  1. The published schema and what the tenant serves do not currently line up. The Learn schema page documents an AgentName column. The tenants I have worked in serve the agent display name as Name. Run a bare AgentsInfo | take 1 and confirm against your own tenant before you trust any query, mine included.
  2. There is no DeviceName column. For local agents the device and account context is nested inside RawAgentInfo.localAgentMetadata, and you have to extend it out.
  3. The table holds multiple snapshots per agent. Without an arg_max you will count the same agent many times over. Every query below deduplicates.

Two more gotchas worth having in your head: trustedProcess and autoApprove come through as strings, so compare them against "true" and "false" rather than casting with tobool(). And AgentId is a guid in AgentsInfo but a string in the exposure graph, so wrap both sides in tostring() when you join.

Filter every local agent query with Platform == "LocalAgents". Without it you are querying the cloud agent estate as well.

The query set

Run these in the Defender portal under Investigation & response > Hunting > Advanced hunting. Microsoft also ships prebuilt queries in the AI Agents folder on the Queries tab, which are worth reading before you write your own. Each query repeats whatever let statements it needs, so any one of them can be pasted in and run on its own.

1. Current local agent inventory

The baseline. One row per agent, latest snapshot, with retired entries dropped. Everything else builds on this shape.

AgentsInfo
| where Platform == "LocalAgents"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
| project LastSeen = Timestamp, Agent = Name, Version, AgentId, LifecycleStatus
| order by Agent asc

2. Device and account context

Unpacks the nested local agent metadata so you get the device and user behind each row – the columns the portal shows but the table does not expose directly.

AgentsInfo
| where Platform == "LocalAgents"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
| extend Meta = RawAgentInfo.localAgentMetadata
| extend Device = tostring(Meta.deviceName),
         Account = tostring(Meta.accountName),
         HostProcess = tostring(Meta.hostProcess),
         AutoApprove = tostring(Meta.autoApprove),
         TrustedProcess = tostring(Meta.trustedProcess)
| project LastSeen = Timestamp, Agent = Name, Version, Device, Account,
          HostProcess, AutoApprove, TrustedProcess
| order by Device asc, Agent asc

3. Risky configuration: auto-approve and untrusted host processes

This is the query that earns its keep. An agent that auto-approves its own actions has no human in the loop, and an untrusted host process means the binary driving the agent is not one Defender recognises. Either on its own is worth a conversation. Together they are a finding.

AgentsInfo
| where Platform == "LocalAgents"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
| extend Meta = RawAgentInfo.localAgentMetadata
| extend AutoApprove = tostring(Meta.autoApprove),
         TrustedProcess = tostring(Meta.trustedProcess),
         Device = tostring(Meta.deviceName),
         Account = tostring(Meta.accountName)
| where AutoApprove =~ "true" or TrustedProcess =~ "false"
| project Agent = Name, Version, Device, Account, AutoApprove,
          TrustedProcess, LastSeen = Timestamp
| order by AutoApprove desc, Agent asc

4. Agent sprawl: how many devices per agent

Turns the row count into something you can take to a steering group. Ten rows of Claude Code across eight devices and six accounts is a different story to ten rows on one developer’s machine.

AgentsInfo
| where Platform == "LocalAgents"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
| extend Meta = RawAgentInfo.localAgentMetadata
| extend Device = tostring(Meta.deviceName), Account = tostring(Meta.accountName)
| summarize Installs = count(),
            Devices = dcount(Device),
            Accounts = dcount(Account),
            Versions = make_set(Version, 20)
  by Agent = Name
| order by Installs desc

5. Version drift

AI agent tooling updates weekly and users update it themselves. Anything with a long tail of versions is a patching conversation you are not currently having, because none of this is in your software inventory.

AgentsInfo
| where Platform == "LocalAgents"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
| summarize VersionCount = dcount(Version),
            Versions = make_set(Version, 50),
            Installs = count()
  by Agent = Name
| where VersionCount > 1
| order by VersionCount desc

6. Newly seen agents in the last seven days

Your shadow AI early warning. Run it weekly, or wrap it in a scheduled hunt. Note that this finds agents whose first snapshot falls inside the window, so during the initial baselining period it will be noisy.

let Window = 7d;
AgentsInfo
| where Platform == "LocalAgents"
| summarize FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp),
            Agent = any(Name), Version = anyif(Version, isnotempty(Version))
  by AgentId
| where FirstSeen > ago(Window)
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, Agent, Version, AgentId
| order by FirstSeen desc

7. MCP servers and declared tools

The MCP server list is the part of this inventory most people have not thought about. An agent is only as contained as the tools it can reach, and a remote MCP endpoint is an egress path that never went through a firewall review.

AgentsInfo
| where Platform == "LocalAgents"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
| extend Meta = RawAgentInfo.localAgentMetadata
| extend Device = tostring(Meta.deviceName), Account = tostring(Meta.accountName)
| mv-expand Server = McpServers
| extend ServerName = tostring(Server.name),
         ServerType = tostring(Server.type),
         Endpoint   = tostring(Server.url)
| where isnotempty(ServerName)
| project Agent = Name, Device, Account, ServerName, ServerType, Endpoint
| order by ServerType asc, ServerName asc

8. Agents on critical devices

Joins the inventory to the exposure graph so you can rank by business impact rather than by agent risk alone. Asset criticality runs 0 for very high through 3 for low. Note that the graph calls the agent identifier id inside aiAgentMetadata.

let LocalAgentNodes =
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | where NodeLabel == "ai-agent"
    | where tostring(NodeProperties.rawData.aiAgentMetadata.platform) == "LocalAgents"
    | extend AgentKey = tostring(NodeProperties.rawData.aiAgentMetadata.id)
    | project AgentNodeId = NodeId, AgentKey, AgentDisplayName = NodeName;
let DeviceNodes =
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | where NodeLabel in ("device", "microsoft.compute/virtualmachines")
    | extend Criticality = toint(NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel)
    | where isnotnull(Criticality) and Criticality <= 1
    | project DeviceNodeId = NodeId, DeviceNodeName = NodeName, Criticality;
ExposureGraphEdges
| where EdgeLabel in ("runs on", "installed on")
| join kind=inner LocalAgentNodes on $left.SourceNodeId == $right.AgentNodeId
| join kind=inner DeviceNodes on $left.TargetNodeId == $right.DeviceNodeId
| project Agent = AgentDisplayName, Device = DeviceNodeName, Criticality, AgentKey
| order by Criticality asc, Agent asc

9. Prompt injection alerts raised against local agents

Once runtime protection is on, this is the detection to watch. Severity is Informational while you are in audit mode and moves to a real severity in block mode, so filter on title rather than severity during a pilot.

AlertInfo
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where Title has_any ("prompt injection", "AI agent", "jailbreak")
| join kind=leftouter (
    AlertEvidence
    | project AlertId, EntityType, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
) on AlertId
| project Timestamp, Title, Severity, Category, DeviceName, AccountName,
          EntityType, FileName, AlertId
| order by Timestamp desc

10. Runtime protection audit and block events

Audit and block events from real-time protection are recorded as behaviours, which is where you go to see what block mode would have stopped before you turn block mode on.

BehaviorInfo
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where Categories has_any ("AI", "Agent") or Description has "agent"
| join kind=leftouter (
    BehaviorEntities
    | project BehaviorId, EntityType, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine
) on BehaviorId
| project Timestamp, ActionType, Description, DeviceName, AccountName, BehaviorId
| order by Timestamp desc

11. Agents whose devices are not covered by runtime protection

The gap analysis. There is no single column that gives you this, so build it from the agent inventory and the set of devices you have targeted with the runtime protection policy, exported from the policy assignment. Swap the let for your own device group logic.

let ProtectedDevices = dynamic(["lap-0001", "lap-0002"]);  // from policy assignment
AgentsInfo
| where Platform == "LocalAgents"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
| extend Device = tostring(RawAgentInfo.localAgentMetadata.deviceName)
| where Device !in~ (ProtectedDevices)
| summarize Agents = make_set(Name, 20), AgentCount = dcount(AgentId) by Device
| order by AgentCount desc

Risk indicators in advanced hunting

The Risk indicators column is the most useful thing in the portal and the most awkward to get at in hunting, because the indicators are not where you would expect them. They are not an array of indicator objects you can mv-expand. Each one is a separate boolean property hanging directly off the agent’s exposure graph node. If you go looking for a riskIndicators collection you will get a single empty row back and conclude the data is not there.

To enumerate what your own tenant is using, read the keys rather than the values:

ExposureGraphNodes
| where NodeLabel == "ai-agent"
| mv-apply K = bag_keys(NodeProperties.rawData) on (project Key = tostring(K))
| summarize Nodes = dcount(NodeId), Agents = make_set(NodeName, 3) by Key
| order by Nodes desc

Anything ending in Indicator is a risk indicator. Run that first, because the set grows during preview and the portal labels do not appear in the data at all – searching the raw JSON for “Critical Device” returns nothing.

12. Agents, devices, accounts and their risk indicators

The query the portal export cannot give you: every local agent with its device, account, host process and the indicators driving its risk level. Note the join key – the graph calls the agent identifier id inside aiAgentMetadata, while AgentsInfo calls it AgentId, and it is a guid on one side and a string on the other.

let LocalAgentNodes =
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | where NodeLabel == "ai-agent"
    | extend Meta = NodeProperties.rawData.aiAgentMetadata
    | where tostring(Meta.platform) == "LocalAgents"
    | extend Raw = NodeProperties.rawData
    | extend
        OnCriticalDevice     = tostring(Raw.agentOnCriticalDeviceIndicator) has "true",
        OnVulnerableDevice   = tostring(Raw.agentOnVulnerableDeviceIndicator) has "true",
        LinkedToCriticalUser = tostring(Raw.agentLinkedToCriticalUserIndicator) has "true"
    | project AgentKey = tostring(Meta.id),
              ProcessName = tostring(Meta.processName),
              OnCriticalDevice, OnVulnerableDevice, LinkedToCriticalUser;
let LocalAgentInventory =
    AgentsInfo
    | where Platform == "LocalAgents"
    | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
    | where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
    | extend AgentMeta = RawAgentInfo.localAgentMetadata
    | project AgentKey = tostring(AgentId), Agent = Name, Version,
              Device  = tostring(AgentMeta.deviceName),
              Account = tostring(AgentMeta.accountName),
              LastSeen = Timestamp;
LocalAgentInventory
| join kind=leftouter LocalAgentNodes on AgentKey
| extend IndicatorCount = toint(OnCriticalDevice) + toint(OnVulnerableDevice)
                        + toint(LinkedToCriticalUser)
| extend Indicators = trim(" ", strcat(
      iff(OnCriticalDevice,     "CriticalDevice ", ""),
      iff(OnVulnerableDevice,   "VulnerableDevice ", ""),
      iff(LinkedToCriticalUser, "CriticalUser ", "")))
| extend Indicators = iff(isempty(Indicators), "None", Indicators)
| project Agent, Version, Device, Account, ProcessName, Indicators, IndicatorCount,
          OnCriticalDevice, OnVulnerableDevice, LinkedToCriticalUser, LastSeen
| order by IndicatorCount desc, Device asc, Agent asc

13. Which indicator combinations actually occur

Rolls the detail up into the combinations present in your estate. This is the view that tells you whether High is being driven by device context, user context, or the two together, and it is not available anywhere in the portal.

let LocalAgentNodes =
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | where NodeLabel == "ai-agent"
    | extend Meta = NodeProperties.rawData.aiAgentMetadata
    | where tostring(Meta.platform) == "LocalAgents"
    | extend Raw = NodeProperties.rawData
    | extend
        OnCriticalDevice     = tostring(Raw.agentOnCriticalDeviceIndicator) has "true",
        OnVulnerableDevice   = tostring(Raw.agentOnVulnerableDeviceIndicator) has "true",
        LinkedToCriticalUser = tostring(Raw.agentLinkedToCriticalUserIndicator) has "true"
    | project AgentKey = tostring(Meta.id),
              ProcessName = tostring(Meta.processName),
              OnCriticalDevice, OnVulnerableDevice, LinkedToCriticalUser;
let LocalAgentInventory =
    AgentsInfo
    | where Platform == "LocalAgents"
    | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
    | where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
    | extend AgentMeta = RawAgentInfo.localAgentMetadata
    | project AgentKey = tostring(AgentId), Agent = Name, Version,
              Device  = tostring(AgentMeta.deviceName),
              Account = tostring(AgentMeta.accountName),
              LastSeen = Timestamp;
LocalAgentInventory
| join kind=inner LocalAgentNodes on AgentKey
| extend Indicators = trim(" ", strcat(
      iff(OnCriticalDevice,     "CriticalDevice ", ""),
      iff(OnVulnerableDevice,   "VulnerableDevice ", ""),
      iff(LinkedToCriticalUser, "CriticalUser ", "")))
| extend Indicators = iff(isempty(Indicators), "None", Indicators)
| summarize Agents  = count(),
            Devices = dcount(Device),
            Users   = dcount(Account),
            AgentNames = make_set(Agent, 5)
  by Indicators
| order by Agents desc

14. Where the exposure is concentrated, by user

The one to lead a client conversation with. Local agents inherit the identity of the person running them, so the useful unit of analysis is the person, not the agent. This also builds the list you need for the runtime protection device group.

let LocalAgentNodes =
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | where NodeLabel == "ai-agent"
    | extend Meta = NodeProperties.rawData.aiAgentMetadata
    | where tostring(Meta.platform) == "LocalAgents"
    | extend Raw = NodeProperties.rawData
    | extend
        OnCriticalDevice     = tostring(Raw.agentOnCriticalDeviceIndicator) has "true",
        OnVulnerableDevice   = tostring(Raw.agentOnVulnerableDeviceIndicator) has "true",
        LinkedToCriticalUser = tostring(Raw.agentLinkedToCriticalUserIndicator) has "true"
    | project AgentKey = tostring(Meta.id),
              ProcessName = tostring(Meta.processName),
              OnCriticalDevice, OnVulnerableDevice, LinkedToCriticalUser;
let LocalAgentInventory =
    AgentsInfo
    | where Platform == "LocalAgents"
    | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
    | where LifecycleStatus !in~ ("Deleted", "Uninstalled")
    | extend AgentMeta = RawAgentInfo.localAgentMetadata
    | project AgentKey = tostring(AgentId), Agent = Name, Version,
              Device  = tostring(AgentMeta.deviceName),
              Account = tostring(AgentMeta.accountName),
              LastSeen = Timestamp;
LocalAgentInventory
| join kind=inner LocalAgentNodes on AgentKey
| summarize Agents = dcount(AgentKey),
            Devices = dcount(Device),
            AgentNames = make_set(Agent, 10),
            CriticalDeviceAgents = countif(OnCriticalDevice),
            VulnerableDeviceAgents = countif(OnVulnerableDevice),
            IsCriticalUser = countif(LinkedToCriticalUser) > 0
  by Account
| order by CriticalDeviceAgents desc, Agents desc

What you can actually do from the portal

This is the question every client asks within about ninety seconds of seeing the inventory, and it deserves a straight answer. There is no “block this agent” button on an agent row. Discovery and posture are read paths. The enforcement lives in capabilities you already own, pointed at what discovery found.

1. AI agent runtime protection, in audit then block

This is the primary control, and it is the subject of Parts 1 and 2 of this series, so I will keep it short here. It detects prompt injection in content that local agents read, at the device level, through two mechanisms:

  • Agent-native event inspection (AiAgentProtection) for agents that expose a vendor-supported event interface.
  • Network inspection (AiAgentNetworkInspection) for agents that do not.

Both take Disabled, Audit or Block. In audit the agent action still runs and you get an informational Suspicious AI prompt injection alert. In block the action is stopped before it executes, the agent terminal tells the user what was blocked and why, and the alert carries a real severity.

Deploy it from Endpoints > Configuration management > Endpoint security policies > Windows policies > Create new policy, using the Microsoft Defender AI agent runtime protection template. That template covers agent-native inspection only. Network inspection currently needs a PowerShell platform script running in system context:

Set-MpPreference -AiAgentNetworkInspection Audit

# verify on a device
Get-MpPreference | Select-Object AiAgentProtection, AiAgentNetworkInspection
Get-MpComputerStatus | Select-Object AntivirusSignatureVersion

Targeting is by group, and the group has to contain devices. In Intune you assign the policy to a device group. For devices managed through Defender security settings management you assign it to an Entra ID security group whose members are the devices themselves. There is no user targeting.

That constraint matters more here than it does for most endpoint policies, because the exposure sits with a handful of developers rather than with any device collection you already maintain. Query 2 gives you the device and account pairs behind every discovered agent, which is the list to build the security group from.

Signature version 1.451.224.0 or later is required, and during preview test devices should sit on the Beta channel for Defender updates.

2. Security recommendations on the agent page

Open Agent page gives you a Security recommendations tab with the description, evidence, remediation steps and the affected agents for each finding, and each recommendation is mapped to the risk indicators it reduces. These are posture fixes rather than enforcement, but they are the prioritised work list and they are the one place the product tells you what “good” looks like.

Recommendations are calculated separately from the risk level, so a High agent may have none and a Medium one may have several. Do not use recommendation count as a proxy for risk.

3. The attack surface map and Go hunt

From the agent flyout, View on map puts the agent in the exposure graph alongside the devices, identities and resources it touches, and Go hunt drops you into advanced hunting pre-scoped to that agent. For an agent on a critical device the map is the fastest way to show a client what the blast radius actually is.

4. Standard Defender response, once an alert fires

Agent detections correlate into incidents like anything else, which means the full device-level response surface applies: isolate device, run antivirus scan, collect investigation package, restrict app execution, initiate automated investigation, and live response for anything bespoke. The agent is a process running as the user, so everything you would do to contain a compromised user session applies unchanged.

5. The controls that are not in the AI agents page at all

If the decision is that a given agent should not be running in the estate, discovery gives you the target list and the enforcement comes from elsewhere:

  • App control (WDAC) or AppLocker to stop the binary executing, and Restrict app execution as a per-device containment action.
  • Network protection and custom indicators to block specific remote MCP endpoints once you have the URLs from query 7.
  • Web content filtering to put the AI category on a monitored or blocked footing.
  • Conditional Access and app governance for anything that authenticates with a work identity, which is the Agent 365 and Entra Agent ID story rather than the local agent one.

Be honest with clients about where the line sits. Defender will tell you what is running, tell you what is risky about it, and stop prompt injection against it. It will not currently uninstall it for you.

A practical sequence

  1. Confirm Defender Antivirus is in active mode with real-time protection on across the estate. No active mode, no discovery.
  2. Let the inventory build for three to four weeks. Resist reporting on it until the trend settles.
  3. Run queries 1, 2 and 4 to get the real agent, device and account spread, and share it with the business. The conversation that follows is usually more productive than the technical work.
  4. Run query 3. Auto-approve and untrusted host processes are your first remediation list.
  5. Run queries 12 to 14 to see which risk indicators are actually firing, which combinations produce the High rows, and which handful of people carry most of the exposure.
  6. Run query 7 and catalogue the MCP endpoints. Decide which remote endpoints are sanctioned.
  7. Build a device group from the discovery output and enable runtime protection in audit mode against it.
  8. Review alerts and behaviours for one to two weeks using queries 9 and 10, mark false positives, then widen the audit scope.
  9. Move to block mode, starting with the critical devices identified by query 8.

Verify before you trust

Two notes in the interest of not wasting your afternoon. The AgentsInfo schema documentation and what tenants actually serve are not currently aligned, and the nested localAgentMetadata properties have moved during preview. Run the queries against your own tenant and adjust the column names before you build anything on top of them. Feature availability also varies by tenant during preview, so confirm what you have rather than what the documentation says you should have.

Where this goes next

Discovery is the easy half. The harder question, and the one I will come back to, is what a sanctioned local AI agent actually looks like in a managed estate: which agents are approved, which MCP servers they may reach, which accounts may run them, and how any of that is enforced rather than documented. Microsoft has given us the visibility. The policy is still ours to write.


The rest of the series

References

Seรกn O’Farrell | cloud-secure.ai

Microsoft Defender AI agent runtime protection: the control for agents already on your endpoints (part 1)

Microsoft Defender AI agent runtime protection, part 1: stopping prompt injection at the endpoint

Draft for cloud-secure.ai. Public preview feature – verify current tenant availability and the support matrix before publishing.

About this series. Runtime protection covers a number of agents and two different inspection methods, and I will set all of that out properly below so you know what is genuinely in scope. The walkthroughs, lab build and demonstrations across this series then use Claude throughout – Claude Code and the Claude Code extension for VS Code. That is a deliberate choice rather than a limitation: Anthropicโ€™s agents are on the agent-native inspection list, they are among the most likely to already be installed on a developerโ€™s machine without anyone having approved them, and all three Claude entries register through the same hooks interface, so one demonstration tells you how the others behave. Everything shown applies to the other agent-native agents on the list, with one caveat I will come back to.

The gap nobody budgeted for

Local AI agents have arrived on corporate endpoints faster than most security programmes have adapted to them. Coding assistants, CLI tools and desktop AI apps now sit on developer laptops across the organisation, reading files, calling tools and running commands. They do all of this with the signed-in userโ€™s privileges.

That is the uncomfortable part. An agent is not a sandboxed process with a narrow permission set. It is a highly capable automation layer wearing your userโ€™s identity, and it cannot reliably tell the difference between content it was asked to read and instructions hidden inside that content.

This is prompt injection, and it is the defining threat to local agents. A developer asks a coding agent to summarise a projectโ€™s documentation. The page contains hidden text instructing the agent to read the local .env file and POST the contents to an external URL. The agent treats that instruction as part of the page and complies. No malware ran. No exploit was needed. The agent was simply convinced.

Defender for Endpoint discovery already tells you which agents exist on your estate. It does not tell you when one is being hijacked. AI agent runtime protection closes that gap.

What runtime protection actually does

Runtime protection inspects the points in the agent loop where content enters or leaves the agentโ€™s reasoning: the user prompt, the tool request before it executes, and the tool response after it returns.

The key design decision is that Defender inspects the content regardless of where it came from. A file, a web page, a repository, a toolโ€™s output – it does not matter. If malicious instructions reach a point Defender can see, they get scanned.

In the .env example above, Defender detects the injection in the tool response and blocks the action before any data leaves the device.

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint AI agent runtime protection flow, from Intune policy through detection and response

Each scan is a fast inline check at a defined point, not continuous monitoring of the agent process. Added latency is minimal.

Microsoftโ€™s own overview of the feature is here: AI agent runtime protection with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (Preview). Worth reading alongside this, though be aware the documentation and the product do not agree on every detail – something I will come back to in part 2.

Where this actually matters

The feature is easy to describe and harder to make a case for, because prompt injection still sounds theoretical to a lot of security teams. It is not. Here are the scenarios I would put in front of a client, in roughly the order they are likely to happen.

The poisoned documentation page

A developer asks a coding agent to summarise the integration docs for a third-party API. The page contains white-on-white text, or an HTML comment, instructing the agent to read the local .env file and include its contents in a request to an external URL.

The agent cannot distinguish the pageโ€™s content from the pageโ€™s instructions. It reads the file and makes the request. No malware ran, no exploit was used, no endpoint control fired, because nothing happened that looks like an attack – a trusted process read a local file and made an outbound web request, which is exactly what it does all day.

This is the canonical case, and it is why inspection has to sit inside the agent loop rather than around it.

The repository you did not write

A developer clones a repository to evaluate it, and asks the agent to explain how it works. The injection is in a README, a code comment, a test fixture, or a CONTRIBUTING.md file nobody reads.

This one worries me more than the web page scenario, because cloning and exploring unfamiliar repositories is a routine, encouraged developer behaviour, and because the payload travels with the repository. Anyone who clones it and points an agent at it gets the same instructions.

The tool response you did not anticipate

An agent connected to an MCP server calls a tool – a ticketing system, a wiki, an internal search index – and the response contains instructions rather than data.

This is the case that scales badly. The injection does not need to reach the developerโ€™s machine; it needs to reach any system the agent can query. A malicious ticket description, a poisoned wiki page, a crafted search result in an internal index all become delivery mechanisms. Anyone who can write to a system the agent reads from can attempt to steer the agent.

Defender inspects the tool response after execution, which is the point at which this becomes visible.

The agent with more reach than the developer realised

Agents accumulate connections. A coding agent that started with filesystem access ends up with a GitHub token, a cloud CLI session, a database connection and three MCP servers, because each one was useful at the time.

The agent runs with the userโ€™s privileges, so a successful injection inherits all of it. The question to ask a client is not โ€œcould an agent be hijackedโ€ but โ€œif one were, what would it reach from that laptopโ€. For a developer with production credentials cached, the answer is uncomfortable.

Runtime protection does not reduce that blast radius – that is a least-privilege conversation – but it is the control that notices the attempt.

The developer testing the boundaries

Not every detection is an attack. Some are a developer seeing what the agent will do if asked nicely, which is human and mostly harmless.

It still matters. For a regulated organisation, โ€œwe have no visibility into what our staff are asking AI agents to do on corporate endpointsโ€ is a poor answer to an auditor. Runtime protection in audit mode produces an evidence trail without blocking anything, which is often the first genuinely useful output a client gets from this.

The governance answer you will be asked for

Irish public sector and enterprise clients are working through AI governance obligations – the EU AI Act timeline, NIS2 transposition, and in many cases their own board asking what controls exist around AI tooling. The specific obligations vary by organisation and sector, and I would not claim this feature satisfies any particular article of anything.

What it does provide is a documented, policy-enforced, auditable technical control over AI agent behaviour on managed endpoints, with alerts flowing into the existing SOC queue. That is a materially better position than a written policy saying staff should be careful, which is where most organisations currently are.

If you are being asked โ€œwhat are we doing about AI riskโ€, this is one of the few answers that is a control rather than a document.

A note on what it does not do

Worth being straight with clients about the limits, because overselling this will cost you credibility later.

It does not protect agents that are not on the supported list, which is most of them. It does not protect cloud-hosted agents – that is Security for AI. It does not reduce what an agent can reach. It is inspection and detection, with blocking where the agentโ€™s hooks allow it, and it is in public preview.

What it does is close the specific gap where a trusted agent is persuaded to act against its user by content it was asked to read. That is a real gap, it is currently unmonitored in almost every organisation, and until now there was nothing to point at.

Two inspection methods

Defender uses two distinct approaches, and understanding the difference matters because they are configured separately and cover different agents.

Agent-native event inspection

This uses the vendor-supported event interfaces that some agents expose – hooks, in practice. Defender registers at defined points in the agentโ€™s execution flow, inspects what is passing through, and applies an audit or block decision before the agent continues.

Because it sits inside the agentโ€™s own extensibility model, this method can stop malicious content from progressing through the agent loop, and can prevent a harmful tool action from running at all. It is the stronger of the two.

On Windows, the documented agent-native coverage is:

Agent Vendor Hooks interface Used in this series
Claude Code Anthropic Claude Code hooks Yes – demonstrated
VS Code Claude Code extension Anthropic Claude Code hooks Yes – demonstrated
Claude Desktop Anthropic Claude Code hooks Same hooks interface
GitHub Copilot app GitHub Copilot hooks reference Supported, not demonstrated
GitHub Copilot CLI GitHub Copilot CLI hooks Supported, not demonstrated
VS Code GitHub Copilot extension GitHub Copilot hooks reference Supported, not demonstrated

That is a short list, and worth reading carefully. The three Anthropic entries all register through the same Claude Code hooks interface, which is why a demonstration against Claude Code tells you how Claude Desktop and the VS Code extension will behave too. The GitHub entries split across two interfaces – the Copilot hooks reference for the app and the VS Code extension, and a separate CLI hooks interface for the CLI.

Here is the caveat I promised. Defenderโ€™s mechanism is identical across all six – it registers at defined points in the agentโ€™s execution flow – but Anthropic and GitHub are separate vendor integrations. A clean result against Claude does not entitle you to assume Copilot behaves the same way in your environment. If you have both deployed, validate both.

Microsoftโ€™s overview article also references Codex CLI in the narrative text, but the support matrix does not currently list it under agent-native inspection. Treat the support matrix as authoritative and check it again before you scope a rollout, because this is moving weekly.

Network inspection

For agents that do not expose a vendor event interface, Defender inspects the agent-to-LLM network flows instead, detecting prompt injection in transit.

Current Windows coverage is OpenClaw, Ollama Desktop, ChatGPT Classic and ChatGPT Desktop. Two hard limitations: network inspection does not support agents that use certificate pinning, and it does not support HTTP/3.

Use it to close the gap for agents that would otherwise have no runtime protection at all. Do not mistake it for equivalent coverage.

The discovery list is much longer than the protection list

This is the single most important point to land with a client. Defenderโ€™s local AI agent discovery covers well over fifty agents on Windows – Cursor, Gemini CLI, Warp, Windsurf, Kiro, Goose, Cline, Qwen, the lot. Runtime protection covers roughly ten.

An agent appearing in your inventory does not mean it is protected. Discovery and protection are two different capabilities with two different support matrices, and conflating them will give you a false sense of coverage.

The supported scenarios, in full

Before narrowing to Claude for the rest of the series, here is the complete picture of what this feature does and does not reach. Getting this wrong in a client conversation is easy, because several Microsoft products share a name and are protected by entirely different controls.

In scope – agent-native inspection. The six agents in the table above: Claude Code, Claude Desktop and the VS Code Claude Code extension, plus GitHub Copilot CLI, the GitHub Copilot app and the VS Code GitHub Copilot extension. This is the strongest coverage, because Defender sits inside the agentโ€™s own hooks and can stop an action before it runs. One setting, Ai Agent Protection, governs all six.

In scope – network inspection. OpenClaw, Ollama Desktop, ChatGPT Classic and ChatGPT Desktop. Separate setting, AiAgentNetworkInspection. Weaker coverage, and it will not see agents using certificate pinning or HTTP/3.

In scope – Windows Subsystem for Linux, in preview. Claude Code, Codex CLI and GitHub Copilot CLI are supported for discovery when running under WSL. Note this is discovery support; WSL support does not imply support on native Linux endpoints.

In scope – macOS, in preview. Discovery covers a broad agent list on macOS. Runtime protection is currently documented for Windows.

Discovery only – everything else. Cursor, Gemini CLI, Warp, Windsurf, Kiro, Goose, Cline, Qwen and roughly fifty more. Defender will inventory them and report their MCP server configurations. It will not inspect or block them. This is the line that matters most: an agent in your inventory is not an agent under protection.

Not in scope – Microsoft 365 Copilot. It is not a local agent running on the endpoint with the userโ€™s privileges, so there is nothing for endpoint runtime protection to hook into. M365 Copilot is governed through Purview – DSPM for AI, sensitivity labels, and the data it is permitted to ground on.

Not in scope here – Copilot Studio and Foundry agents. These are cloud-hosted and fall under Defenderโ€™s Security for AI real-time protection rules, managed under Settings > Security for AI > Policies & rules > Real-time protection in the Defender portal. Same philosophy, inspect the agentic loop and block risky actions inline, but a different configuration surface, different licensing and a different support matrix.

The short version for a client conversation: endpoint runtime protection handles the agents running on the laptop, Security for AI handles the agents running in the cloud, and Purview handles what M365 Copilot can see. All three are needed. None of them substitutes for the others.

From here on I will work through Claude. Everything that follows applies to the GitHub agents too, with the caveat noted above that each vendor integration deserves its own validation run rather than an assumption.

Modes

Both inspection methods support the same three modes.

Disabled. Protection is off. Defender does not inspect agent activity at all. This is the default.

Audit. Defender allows the action to continue and records the detection. A security alert is raised at Informational severity, so the SOC can see what would have been blocked without triaging it as a live incident.

Block. Defender blocks the threat, notifies the user in the agent UI and through a Windows toast, records the detection in Protection history on the device, and raises a security alert that is correlated into an incident. Severity is Critical, High, Medium or Low based on assessed risk.

The setting is protected by tamper protection, so neither a curious user nor malware can quietly switch it off.

Prerequisites

Before you touch a policy:

  • A Defender for Endpoint Plan 2, Microsoft 365 E5, Microsoft Agent 365 or Microsoft 365 E7 licence.
  • Devices onboarded to Defender for Endpoint, with Defender Antivirus in active mode and real-time protection enabled.
  • Current platform, engine and security intelligence updates. Check the signature version is 1.451.224.0 or later.
  • One or more supported local AI agents actually installed, for whichever inspection method you are enabling.
  • During public preview, put your test devices on the Beta Channel for Defender platform and engine updates.
  • Intune role with permission to create and assign device configurations, such as Policy and Profile Manager, if you are deploying through Intune.
  • Security Reader, Security Operator or Security Administrator to review the alerts.

The Beta Channel requirement is the one that catches people out. If your test devices are on the default channel, you will enable the setting, run the test and see nothing.

Where this sits in the wider picture

Endpoint runtime protection is one piece. Defenderโ€™s Security for AI capabilities also cover discovery of cloud and platform agents built with Copilot Studio, Microsoft Foundry, AWS Bedrock and GCP Vertex AI, posture assessment for agent configurations, and real-time protection rules managed under Settings > Security for AI > Policies & rules.

For organisations adopting Agent 365, endpoint runtime protection is the local half of a model that is also being extended to Microsoft-built, third-party and tooling-server agents.

Closing thought

Most organisations have not yet decided whether local AI agents are sanctioned. They are already installed either way. Discovery will tell you how many you have, which is usually a sobering number. Runtime protection is the first control that does something about it.

It is in public preview, the supported agent list is short, and network inspection has real limits. None of that is a reason to wait. Turn on discovery, get audit mode onto the handful of devices where supported agents are in daily use, and build an evidence base before someone else builds it for you.

Coming in part 2: the build. Configuring the Intune policies through the portal, getting the device onto the Beta channel, installing and discovering a local agent, confirming Defender has actually hooked into it, and running the Microsoft demonstration end to end – including several places where the product does not behave the way the documentation says it does.

Further reading


This feature is in public preview at the time of writing. Verify current availability in your own tenant and check the Microsoft support matrix before planning a deployment.